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Abstract 
In the current study, we examined the role of intelligence and executive functions in the 
resolution of temporary syntactic ambiguity using an individual differences approach. Data 
were collected from 174 adolescents and adults who completed a battery of cognitive tests as 
well as a sentence comprehension task. The critical items for the comprehension task 
consisted of object/subject garden paths (e.g. While Anna dressed the baby that was small 
and cute played in the crib.), and participants answered a comprehension question (e.g. Did 
Anna dress the baby?) following each one. Previous studies have shown that garden-path 
misinterpretations tend to persist into final interpretations. Results showed that both 
intelligence and processing speed interacted with ambiguity. Individuals with higher 
intelligence and faster processing were more likely to answer the comprehension questions 
correctly, and specifically, following ambiguous as opposed to unambiguous sentences. 
Inhibition produced a marginal effect, but the variance in inhibition was largely shared with 
intelligence. Conclusions focus on the role of individual differences in cognitive ability and 
their impact on syntactic ambiguity resolution.  
 
Keywords: executive function, intelligence, syntactic ambiguity resolution, individual 
differences, garden-path sentence  
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Executive function and intelligence in the resolution of temporary syntactic ambiguity: An 
individual differences investigation 
  
In this study, we examined the role of executive function and intelligence in syntactic 
ambiguity resolution. A commonly reported finding is that readers often retain the garden-
path misinterpretation in the final representation derived from many temporarily ambiguous 
sentences (Christianson, Hollingworth, Halliwell, & Ferreira, 2001; Engelhardt, Ferreira, & 
Patsenko, 2010; Ferreira, Christianson, & Hollingworth, 2001; Patson, Darowski, Moon, & 
Ferreira, 2009; Van Gompel, Pickering, Pearson, & Jacob, 2006). The finding that readers 
only partially reanalyse garden-path sentences has led to a view of comprehension in which 
people develop shallow and superficial representations, which is referred to as good-enough 
comprehension (Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002; Ferreira, Engelhardt, & Jones, 2009; 
Ferreira & Patson, 2007; Sanford & Sturt, 2002; Sturt, 2007). The good enough view of 
language comprehension is based on a central assumption of resource-limitation, and it 
suggests that when confronted with difficulty, participants will adopt an effort-conservation 
strategy in which time and processing effort may be curtailed (Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, & 
Goldstein, 1999; Gigerenzer, 2008; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer & Selten, 
2001; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). However, within a resource-limitation perspective, it is 
not entirely clear how individual differences affect the generation of good-enough 
representations. Previous work has generally assumed that individuals with lower abilities 
should be more even more susceptible to garden-path errors (Christianson et al., 2001; 
Ferreira, 2003). However, if flexible strategies and good-enough processing are adaptive, 
then perhaps the reverse might be true. That is, individuals with higher cognitive abilities 
may also commonly show the types of errors that have been associated with good-enough 
processing, particularly if success on the task does not depend on accurate comprehension. 
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Therefore, the main goal of this investigation was to further understand the relationship 
between individual differences and ability to overcome (or revise) syntactic ambiguities. 
Executive Functions 
The most commonly postulated executive functions are inhibition, set shifting, and 
updating/retrieval from working memory (Burgess, 1997; Denckla, 1996; Miyake & 
Friedman, 2012; Miyake et al., 2000). These abilities are believed to be general purpose 
control mechanisms that regulate everyday behaviours and underlie performance on many, if 
not all, complex cognitive tasks (Burgess, Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998). A 
large literature has focused on how executive functions are related to one another, and how 
they relate to different types of intelligence (for an overview see Freidman et al., 2006). In 
general, executive functions tend to correlate with one another and they also correlate with 
intelligence (Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005; Ardila, Pineda, & Rosselli, 2000; Blair, 2006; 
Dempster, 1991; Larson, Merritt, & Williams, 1988; Logan, 1985; Miyake, Friedman, 
Rettinger, Shah, & Hegarty, 2001; Teuber, 1972). There are a couple of points that can be 
made in summarizing the literature on executive functions and intelligence. The first is that 
there is both shared and unique variance (i.e., general mental abilities are correlated with one 
another but at the same time dissociable). The second is that executive functions represent 
specific low-level control mechanisms (Miyake et al., 2000), whereas intelligence represents 
functioning across much wider and broader neural networks (Gray, Chabris, & Braver, 2003). 
The theoretical model of intelligence that we subscribe to is the Three-Stratum Theory of 
intelligence (Carroll, 1993), which was based on a comprehensive survey of factor-analytic 
studies (see also, Bates & Stough, 1997; Deary, 2001). In this theory, g is represented as the 
highest level (Spearman, 1927). Within stratum two, there are eight broad based factors, 
including (for our purposes) fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and speed of 
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processing. The bottom stratum encompasses even narrower abilities, which map onto those 
assessed by various intelligence tests (e.g. the Wechsler Intelligence Scales).  
One of the most comprehensive investigations of the relationship between executive 
functions and intelligence was conducted by Friedman et al. (2006). They reported that 
working memory ability is highly predictive of both fluid and crystallized intelligence (both 
β’s > .74) (see also Colom, Rebollo, Palacios, Juan-Espinosa, & Kyllonen, 2004). In contrast, 
inhibition and set shifting share much less variance with intelligence (both β’s < .30). In a 
more recent paper, Miyake and Friedman (2012) proposed a theory called the Unity–
Diversity Framework, which specifically addressed the issue of shared and unique variance in 
executive functions (see also, Duncan, Johnson, Swales, & Freer, 1997; Long & Prat, 2002; 
Teuber, 1972). In short, the Unity-Diversity Framework assumes that inhibitory control 
represents shared variance with other executive functions and that there is no “unique” 
variance associated with inhibition. Updating working memory and set shifting, in contrast, 
both have unique and shared variance. 
Sentence Comprehension and Executive Function 
The most extensively studied executive function in relation to sentence 
comprehension is working memory, which is typically measured with some version of the 
reading span task (Baddeley, 1986, 1996; Baddeley & Logie, 1999; Caplan & Waters, 2002; 
Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Kane et al., 2004; MacDonald & Christianson, 2002; 
MacDonald, Just, & Carpenter, 1992; Waters & Caplan, 2001). Much of this research has 
focused on whether the memory resources underlying language comprehension are domain-
specific (Just & Carpenter, 1992) or domain-general (e.g. Federenko, Gibson, & Rhode, 
2006). Some studies have not found overlapping variance between sentence comprehension 
measures and domain-general working memory, which is consistent with the idea that the 
memory system underlying language comprehension is inherent to the architecture of the 
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comprehension system (Baddeley, 1986; 1996; Caplan & Waters, 1999; King & Just, 1991; 
Lewis & Vasishth, 2005; Lewis, Vasishth, & Van Dyke, 2006; Waters & Caplan, 2001). This 
issue is further complicated by results showing that online processing and offline 
comprehension dissociate. For example, Dede, Caplan, Kemtes, and Waters (2004) found that 
working memory capacity was a mediator of comprehension accuracy but not online 
processing (see also, Caplan & Waters, 1999).  
A second issue associated with attempts to relate working memory to language 
comprehension is whether individual differences in working memory are related to capacity 
per se or to interference from items that are retained in memory (Gordon, Hendrik, Johnson, 
& Lee, 2006; Gordon, Hendrick, & Levine, 2002; McElree, Foraker, & Dyer, 2003; Van 
Dyke & McElree, 2006). Gordon et al. (2002) tested a memory-interference hypothesis by 
having participants memorize a short list of words before reading a syntactically complex 
sentence. After reading the sentence and answering a comprehension question, participants 
had to recall the list of words. Gordon et al. found that when items in the list were 
referentially similar to the words in the sentence, participants performed more poorly on the 
comprehension measures, a finding that supports the idea that individual differences in 
working memory are in part attributable to interference among co-present items/information. 
The issues of domain-specificity versus domain-generality and interference versus 
capacity are important, but considerably less research has focused on how individual 
differences in the other executive functions (i.e. inhibition and set shifting) affect language 
comprehension (cf. Booth & Boyle, 2009; January, Trueswell & Thompson-Schill, 2009; 
May, Zacks, Hasher, & Multhaup, 1999; Novick, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2005, 
2010; Vuong & Martin, 2013). There are two other studies that investigated the role of 
inhibitory control in syntactic ambiguity resolution (Christianson, Williams, Zacks, & 
Ferreira, 2006; Engelhardt, Nigg, Carr, & Ferreira, 2008). The question addressed in these 
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two studies was whether individuals with deficits in inhibitory control have additional 
difficulty suppressing the temporary misinterpretations arising from syntactic ambiguity (see 
Table 1). The main assumption was that garden-path sentences require participants to resolve 
competition between two simultaneously competing interpretations, and that perhaps 
successful ambiguity resolution relies on inhibiting the “incorrect” interpretation. In example 
sentence (1), the misinterpretation is that the baby is the direct object of dressed. Christianson 
et al. (2006) tested younger and older adults, under the assumption that aging leads to 
reduced inhibitory control (Chiappe, Hasher, & Siegel, 2000; Hasher & Zacks, 1988). As in 
Table 1, sentences were either ambiguous or unambiguous, and two types of verb were 
tested. After reading a sentence, participants were asked a comprehension question that 
probed thematic role assignment. They found only an age by verb type interaction: Older 
adults were more likely to answer “yes” when the verb was optionally transitive.  
 
<<Insert Table 1 about here>> 
 
In a study with similar logic, Engelhardt et al. (2008) examined how adolescents and 
adults with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) process object/subject garden-
path sentences. Theoretical models of ADHD have traditionally assumed a prominent role for 
deficits in response inhibition (Barkley, 1997; Casey et al., 1997; Nigg, 2001; Nigg, Carr, 
Martel, & Henderson, 2007; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996; Schachar, Tannock, Marriott, & 
Logan, 1995; Tannock & Schachar, 1996). However, Engelhardt et al. (2008) reported a 
different pattern of results compared to Christianson et al. (2006). ADHD status interacted 
with sentence structure (i.e. ambiguous vs. unambiguous), such that participants with ADHD 
showed significantly poorer performance on the unambiguous (or non-garden path) 
sentences. The difference between participants with ADHD and typically-developing controls 
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was also significant for the ambiguous (garden-path) sentences, but this effect was not robust 
once age standardized reading ability was covaried. Thus, Engelhardt et al. (2008) did not 
find evidence that the ability to “inhibit” the garden-path misinterpretation had a substantial 
effect on comprehension accuracy. Neither study, then, firmly established that individuals 
with deficient inhibitory control have additional difficulty in resolving syntactic ambiguity.  
More recently, Vuong and Martin (2013) looked at the relationship between syntactic 
ambiguity resolution and both verbal and non-verbal Stroop performance. Successful 
performance on the Stroop task is believed to rely primarily on inhibitory processes, because 
participants need to inhibit automatic word reading in order to quickly and accurately name 
the color of the ink in which the word is printed (Friedman et al., 2007; Friedman & Miyake, 
2004). Vuong and Martin examined individual differences in a sample of undergraduates (N 
= 48). They found that non-verbal Stroop did not correlate with either verbal Stroop or a 
garden-path comprehension task. In contrast, the verbal Stroop task correlated with the 
tendency to revise garden-path misinterpretations. Verbal Stroop performance accounted for 
approximately 13% of the variance in comprehension accuracy, and on the basis of that 
result, Vuong and Martin concluded that domain-specific executive control influences 
syntactic reanalysis (see also Protopapas, Archonti, & Skaloumbakas, 2007).  
In their discussion, Vuong and Martin (2013) raised an important issue: They noted 
that previous studies (e.g. Christianson et al., 2006), which examined both working memory 
and syntactic reanalysis could not rule out a domain-specific executive control account. This 
is because working memory tasks also involve executive control, and thus are not pure 
measures of working memory. Of course, task impurity issues are a problem with virtually all 
complex cognitive tasks (Miyake et al., 2000), and working memory span tasks are no 
exception. Moreover, the Vuong and Martin study is subject to the same criticism that they 
noted in other work. Christianson et al. (2006) and Engelhardt et al. (2008) were interested in 
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how inhibition deficits affect the comprehension of sentences containing temporary syntactic 
ambiguities. Both of those studies also assessed working memory, and thus, attempted to 
differentiate (or control) for variance in at least two separate executive abilities. In contrast, 
Vuong and Martin did not assess working memory, and therefore, their study cannot rule out 
that part of the 13% of variance accounted for by verbal Stroop on comprehension 
performance is shared with variance in working memory (or shifting abilities).  
In an even more recent study, Van Dyke, Johns, and Kukona (2014) conducted one of 
the most comprehensive assessments of sentence comprehension and its relationship to 
individual differences ever conducted. They used a battery of 24 different cognitive tasks. 
The goal of the study was to determine which factor(s) contribute to poor comprehension, 
and in particular, they focused on capacity versus interference explanations of working 
memory. To do so, they used the Gordon et al. (2002) comprehension paradigm, which 
involves a memory load and presence/absence of interfering information. As mentioned 
previously, many studies have examined working memory “capacity” as a central feature of 
comprehension (Gibson, 1998). However, more recent work has tended to focus on 
interference effects (e.g. Gordon et al., 2002; May, Hasher, & Kane, 1999; Van Dyke & 
McElree, 2006) as primary determinants of comprehension performance. These newer 
perspectives emphasize factors that affect retrieval at the time when past information is 
needed for current processing, for example to establish long-distance dependencies within a 
sentence.  
In order to analyse their data, Van Dyke et al. partialled the shared variance between 
intelligence and working memory. The rationale for doing so is that intelligence is a broad 
(domain-general) factor that accounts for a substantial proportion of variance in all human 
performance. After variance in intelligence was removed, working memory capacity was no 
longer a significant predictor of comprehension, which led Van Dyke et al. to conclude that 
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the relationship between working memory and sentence comprehension is spurious and 
attributable to (shared) domain-general variance. The only factor that remained after 
intelligence was partialled out was receptive vocabulary (Nation, 2009). With respect to 
reading time data, the pattern was such that individuals with smaller vocabularies sped up 
more under memory load as compared to high vocabulary individuals. This pattern was 
interpreted as evidence that low vocabulary participants read faster because they tended to 
prioritize recall over comprehension. Therefore, not surprisingly, individuals with poorer 
vocabulary scores also performed more poorly on comprehension questions, especially when 
interference was present. Based on these findings, Van Dyke et al. support a model of 
memory that relies primarily on a rapid cue-based retrieval mechanism, which is consistent 
with interference- as compared to capacity-based theories of working memory.  
Current Study 
In the current study, we examined individual differences in order to investigate the 
role of both executive function and intelligence in the resolution of syntactic ambiguity. 
Throughout the remainder of this paper, we use the term “intelligence” to refer to a more 
domain-general measure, which was based on several Wechsler (performance and verbal) 
subtests, and when we refer to domain-specific intelligence (e.g. verbal intelligence), we 
explicitly note it. Our primary aim was to follow up the idea that executive functioning plays 
a significant role in garden-path reanalysis. Recall that Vuong and Martin (2013) reported 
that performance on the verbal Stroop task accounted for approximately 13% of the variance 
(as measured by simple bi-variate correlations) in garden-path comprehension accuracy. The 
Stroop task is typically taken as a measure of inhibitory control (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). 
However, most of the variance in garden-path reanalysis remains unexplained, and thus, other 
individual difference variables remain to be investigated (Van Dyke et al., 2014). In addition, 
because Vuong and Martin did not assess intelligence, working memory, or shifting, it is 
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unclear how much of the 13% variance explained by inhibitory control is shared and how 
much is unique. If the variance is shared as the Unity–Diversity Framework assumes (Miyake 
& Freidman, 2012), then Vuong and Martin's conclusions require substantial qualification.  
In this study, we assessed a large sample of participants on a battery of cognitive tasks 
that assessed both executive functioning and intelligence. We used linear mixed effects 
models that included fixed factors for ambiguity (structure type) and verb type (see Table 1). 
We assessed intelligence using several subtests from the Wechsler intelligence scales 
(Wechsler, 1997a; 1997b), speed of processing using simple “go” reaction time, inhibitory 
control using a verbal Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) and stop-signal reaction time (Logan, 
1994), and shifting using the Trails task (Partington & Leiter, 1949) and perseveration errors 
from the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay, & Curtiss, 1993). The 
rationale for selecting this set of measures is that we wanted to assess intelligence and the two 
executive functions that have the least shared variance with intelligence.  
A second aspect of the study feeding into the rationale is the sample. We wanted to 
avoid restriction of range problems due to the use of convenience (i.e. undergraduate) 
samples, and also we wanted to ensure sufficient power so that results would be stable and 
likely to generalize. Our sample contained nearly 20 participants for each individual 
difference variable, and participants were community recruited. The use of community-
recruited participants ensures a greater range of abilities. In summary, debates continue as to 
whether the memory system associated with language processing is domain-general or 
domain-specific, and whether individual differences in memory are captured by capacity or 
the ability to control interference. In this study, we elected to set those issues aside and 
instead to focus on whether (and how strongly) intelligence and executive functions, 
specifically inhibition and shifting, are related to ambiguity resolution. Moreover, by 
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assessing several individual differences variables in a large sample, we are in a better position 
to isolate unique variance.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 174 adolescents and adults, who were recruited through local 
schools and widespread public advertisements. Table 2 contains a demographic summary of 
the sample. All participants completed a comprehensive testing procedure that took place 
across two testing sessions. During the first visit, participants completed a semi-structured 
clinical interview (i.e., for adults the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV, and for 
adolescents and their parents the Kiddie Schedule for Affective Disorders and 
Schizophrenia). During this visit, participants also completed the assessments of intelligence. 
In the second visit, participants completed a battery of cognitive tasks, which were 
administered in a fixed order. Table 3 contains descriptive statistics and Table 4 shows bi-
variate correlations between the variables that were examined in the study. 
 
<<Insert Tables 2 & 3 about here>> 
 
Measures 
Intelligence. Participants 17 years of age and older completed five subtests of the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – 3rd edition (WAIS-III), and participants 16 years of age 
and younger completed five subtests of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – 4th 
edition (WISC-IV). The subtests used in this study were vocabulary, similarities, picture 
completion and matrix reasoning from the WAIS-III and block design from the WISC-IV. 
Vocabulary requires participants to provide the definitions of words and measures the degree 
to which one has learned and is able to express meanings verbally. Similarities requires 
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participants to describe how two words are similar, with the more difficult items typically 
describing the opposite ends of a “unifying continuum”. The similarities subtest measures 
abstract verbal reasoning. The picture completion task requires participants to identify a 
missing detail within a picture, and thus, measures the ability to perceive missing visual 
details. Block design and matrix reasoning measure non-verbal abstract problem solving and 
spatial perception. In block design, participants must use red and white blocks to construct a 
pattern and in matrix reasoning participants must identify a missing pattern from an array.   
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. Participants completed a computerized version of the 
Wisconsin Card Sort Test (Heaton et al., 1993). This task requires participants to match a 
card to one of four other cards based on different attributes (shape, colour, quantity, or 
design). Participants are given feedback after every decision. After 10 correct decisions, the 
sorting attribute changes. Number of perseveration errors was the dependent variable (i.e., the 
number of incorrect decisions based on a previous match attribute). Perseveration errors 
indicate poorer shifting (or flexibility) in the face of changing task requirements (Anderson, 
Damasio, Jones, & Tranel, 1991). 
Trail Making Test. The Trail Making Test is a common paper-and-pencil measure of 
shifting (Reitan, 1958). In part A, the participant rapidly connects a series of numbers in 
sequential order. In part B, the participant must rapidly draw a line between alternating 
numbers and letters in sequential and alphabetical order, respectively. Part B, therefore, 
requires the ability to rapidly shift between two mental sets (Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000). The 
time to complete part A was subtracted from the time to complete part B, and so higher 
scores indicate worse set shifting performance.  
Stroop Task. The Stroop task requires the ability to monitor response conflict and 
suppress a competing response in order to successfully execute the task requirements (Stroop, 
1935). Thus, it requires inhibition (or interference control processes). Participants completed 
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a paper-and-pencil version of the Stroop Color-Word Interference test (Golden, 1978), in 
which individual trials occurred at 45 second intervals. An interference control composite 
score was calculated by regressing the color-word naming speed on the word- and color-
naming speeds and then saving the unstandardized residual (Martel, Nikolas, & Nigg, 2007). 
This statistical procedure follows recommendations for isolating the Stroop effect from 
processing speed and thereby avoiding the most common psychometric problems with 
alternative scoring methods (Lansbergen, Kenemans, & van Engeland, 2007). The different 
conditions used blocked trials. Higher scores indicated better performance. 
Stop Task. The Stop task assesses response inhibition, that is, the ability to suppress a 
prepotent motor response (Dempster & Corkill, 1999; Logan, 1994). In this task, participants 
saw an X or an O on a computer screen and had to respond as rapidly as possible with one of 
two keys. These are “go” trials, and they served as a measure of simple reaction time. On 
25% of trials, a tone sounded shortly after the X or O was displayed. The tone signalled that 
participants should withhold their response. These are “stop” trials. A stochastic tracking 
procedure was used to calculate stop signal reaction time (SSRT), or how much warning each 
participant needed to interrupt the button response. Stop signal reaction time was calculated 
by subtracting the average stop signal delay from average reaction time (Logan, 1994). 
Sentence Comprehension. A total of 24 critical items were created, 12 for each verb 
type (see Table 1). For each item, there were both ambiguous and unambiguous versions, and 
thus, two lists were created. Each participant saw only one version of each critical item, and 
the correct response for each question was “no”. There were also 72 filler sentences that each 
had an associated comprehension question. Twenty-four filler questions required a “no” 
response and 48 required a “yes” response. 
Participants were seated at a computer workstation, and given a written description of 
the task. This was followed by spoken instructions after which participants were free to ask 
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questions. Each trial began with a fixation cross, which appeared for 500 ms. The full 
sentence replaced the fixation cross, and after the participants had finished reading the 
sentence, he or she pressed a button to view the comprehension question. The sentence and 
question were separated by a delay of 500 ms, and the question remained on the screen until 
the participant responded “yes” or “no”. Participants completed 10 practice trials, and they 
then saw all 96 sentences in the experimental session. The order of sentences was randomly 
determined for each participant. Comprehension performance was measured as proportion of 
correct responses, and thus, higher scores reflect better comprehension.  
Design and Analysis Procedures 
 The design of the sentence comprehension task was 2 × 2 (structure type × verb type). 
Both variables were manipulated within subject. The statistical analysis consisted of three 
main parts, and where possible, we followed the analysis procedures of Van Dyke et al. 
(2014). In the first part, we submitted the cognitive tasks to an exploratory factor analysis in 
which we saved the retained factors as variables. To preview the findings, we observed 
unique factors for intelligence, inhibition, and processing speed. Shifting, in contrast, did not 
emerge as a unique factor. In the second part of the analysis, we utilized linear mixed effects 
models that contained fixed factors for ambiguity and verb type and random factors for 
subjects and items. To assess intelligence and executive function we added the individual 
difference variables to the mixed effects models. However, to avoid problems associated with 
multi-colinearity and the interpretation of four, five, or six way omnibus models, we added 
each of the individual difference variables to the model separately. The third step in the 
analysis focused on isolating the unique variance due to inhibition and processing speed. 
Therefore, similar to Van Dyke et al., we regressed intelligence onto inhibition and 
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processing speed and saved the unstandardized residuals as variables.2 Crucially, this allowed 
us to ascertain whether the unique variance associated with inhibition and processing speed 
was related to ambiguity resolution. 
Data Screening and Preparation 
Data points that were more than 4.0 standard deviations from the mean for each 
variable were considered outliers, and there were six data points meeting this criterion (i.e. 
less than 1% of the total). Because there were so few outliers, we elected to replace each with 
the mean score on that variable (McCartney, Burchinal, & Bub, 2006; Shafer & Graham, 
2002; Wilcox, Keselman, & Kowalchuk, 1998). To assess multivariate outliers, we examined 
Cook’s D, and used the criterion that any value greater than 1 was an outlier (Stevens, 2002). 
No data were excluded based on this criterion. Inferential tests are also sensitive to deviations 
from normality (Kline, 1998). We applied transformations (i.e., square root, logarithm, or 
inverse) to the skewed variables in the dataset (see Table 3).  
Reliability 
The standardized measures used in the current study are all well-established tests with 
widely accepted reliability. The Wechsler intelligence tests (and the subscales) typically have 
reported reliabilities in the .85 - .95 range (Friedman et al., 2006; Friedman et al., 2007; 
Wechsler, 1997a,b). The mean reliability for our sample was α = .71. The Stroop task and the 
Stop task have reported reliabilities in the .80 - .90 range (Friedman et al., 2007; Friedman & 
Miyake, 2004), and the Trails task and the Wisconsin Card Sort task typically have 
lower/borderline acceptable reliability ~.70 (for extended discussions of reliability in 
standardized executive function tasks see Denckla, 1996; Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Rabbitt, 
1997). For the non-standardized measure (i.e. the sentence processing task), we computed 
                                                          
2
 Recent work (Wurm & Fisicaro, 2014) has suggested several problems with this kind of procedure, specifically 
regarding the interpretation of the “residualized” variables. In order to be as transparent as possible we report a 
follow up in the Discussion to ensure that results are not due to any artefact of residualizing our predictors.  
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split-half reliabilities. Because there were only six items in each of the within subjects 
conditions, we used Spearman-Brown prophecy formula corrected coefficients (Brown, 1910; 
Spearman, 1910). The mean reliability was α = .71, which is just above the traditionally 
acceptable value of .70 (Nunnally, 1978).  
Results 
Factor analysis 
We began the analysis by submitting the individual differences measures to an 
exploratory factor analysis with oblimin rotation. This rotation procedure allows factors to 
correlate with one another, and we extracted factor score estimates, which were saved as 
variables (Thurstone, 1935). The factor analysis produced three factors (with eigenvalues of 
one or greater), which accounted for approximately 53.8% of the total variance. Matrix 
loadings are presented in Table 5 and the correlations between factors are presented in Table 
7. We used .384 as the critical value for interpreting significant factor loadings. Stevens 
(2002) recommends that interpretation of factor loadings should take sample size into 
account. Moreover, he recommends using a more stringent α level (i.e. α = .01 for two-tailed 
tests) and based on the sample size, doubling the critical value for a significant bi-variate 
correlation at α = .01. Therefore, for our sample, we only interpret factor loadings of .384 or 
more. The three factors are straightforwardly interpretable as intelligence, inhibition, and 
processing speed. Intelligence was significant for all four of the Wechsler subtests and 
perseveration errors. The second factor was significant for the two measures designed to 
assess inhibition (i.e. stop signal reaction time and the Stroop task). The second factor also 
showed a significant factor loadings on the Trails task, which is typically taken as a measure 
of shifting. However, the fact that it patterns similarly to the inhibition tasks is not 
unsurprising. In opposite-world trials, participants must inhibit the tendency to name the 
numbers according to their “correct” names, and thus, the Trails task does involve some 
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amount of inhibitory control. The third factor only had one significant factor loading and it 
was “go” reaction time. Thus, this factor represents processing speed. As a final point to note, 
we did not find a unique factor for shifting.  
 
<<Insert Table 5 about here>> 
 
Linear mixed-effects models 
In the second stage, we analyzed the data using logit mixed effects models (Baayen, 
2008; Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Barr, 2008; Jaeger, 2008). Logit mixed models are 
more appropriate for binomial data than are ANOVAs over arcsine transformed proportions 
(Jaeger, 2008). (Comprehension accuracy, the main dependent measure, is binomial.) Both 
the structure type and verb type variables were dummy coded with unambiguous sentences 
and optionally-transitive verbs as baseline. Parameter estimates were determined with 
maximum likelihood modelling using Laplace approximations, and the significance of fixed 
effects were determined with the Wald-Z statistic. We included both subjects and items as 
random effects, as well as by-subjects and by-items random slopes. In cases where model 
convergence was not achieved, we simplified item random slopes, and if necessary, subject 
random slopes (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). If the model still failed to converge, 
then we used glmer instead of lmer. Convergence problems are more likely for categorical 
data (C. Scheepers, personal communication, October 4th, 2013).3 
To begin, we first examined the sentence comprehension task, which had a 2 × 2 
(structure type × verb type) repeated measures design. As can be seen in first lines of Table 6, 
there were significant effects of structure and verb, and the interaction was likewise 
                                                          
3
 Example code for the first linear mixed effects analysis (first lines of Table 6) is presented in Section A of the 
supplementary materials.  
 Individual Differences 19 
 
significant. This is consistent with previous studies that used similar materials (e.g. 
Christianson et al., 2001). Moreover, all of the paired-comparisons were significant (all p’s 
< .01). We then added the individual difference variables (i.e. the extracted factor scores from 
the first analysis) to the mixed effects models. The results of the analyses with intelligence, 
inhibition, and processing speed are shown in Table 6. In all three analyses, the significant 
interaction between structure type and verb type remained significant. The individual 
difference variables showed a significant effect of intelligence and processing speed, as well 
as two significant (two-way) interactions. Intelligence was positively related to 
comprehension and processing speed was negatively related to comprehension (see Table 7). 
The significant interactions were between intelligence and structure type, and between 
processing speed and structure type. The first interaction is that correlations between 
comprehension and intelligence were stronger for the ambiguous as compared to the 
unambiguous conditions (see Figure 1). This pattern indicates that higher performing 
individuals did better on the ambiguous sentences and that intelligence matters somewhat less 
for the unambiguous sentences. However, the correlation between intelligence and the 
unambiguous – optional condition was also marginally significant (r = .14, p = .06).4 In 
contrast, the second interaction reflects the fact that the correlations with processing speed 
were clearly split based on ambiguity (structure type), suggesting that slower processors were 
less likely to answer comprehension questions correctly for the ambiguous sentences in 
particular. As can be seen in Table 6, there was also a marginal effect of inhibition (p = .07), 
and like processing speed, individuals with poorer inhibitory control were less likely to 
answer the comprehension questions correctly. This effect was driven primarily by 
performance with the ambiguous sentences containing optionally-transitive verbs (r = -.15, p 
                                                          
4
 At the suggestion of a reviewer, we have included an additional analysis of the intelligence × sentence 
structure interaction in Section B of the supplementary materials. There is some concern over the df with z-
statistics and the fact that they are anti-conservative. However, the model comparison presented in the 
supplementary materials confirms a significant improvement in model fit.  
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< .05). The other three conditions were not significantly correlated with inhibition 
(p’s > .10).  
 
<<Insert Table 6, Table 7, and Figure 1 about here>> 
 
Isolating unique variance  
In the final section, we partialled the variance due to intelligence by regressing 
intelligence onto each of the other two factors (i.e. inhibition and processing speed) and then 
saving the unstandardized residual. The rationale for this is similar to that adopted by Van 
Dyke et al. (2014). Because intelligence is a domain-general construct that accounts for a 
large amount of variance in virtually every cognitive task, we wanted to exclude it from the 
other individual difference variables to determine whether there was “unique” variance 
associated with inhibition and processing speed.  
After partialling variance in intelligence, there was only one change as compared to 
the patterns reported in Table 6: Inhibition no longer produced even a marginal effect (see 
Table 8). The correlations between inhibition and comprehension and between processing 
speed and comprehension dropped once variance in intelligence was removed. However, the 
effect of processing speed and the interaction between processing speed and structure type 
remained. The significant interaction was similar to the one reported above. Individuals with 
higher mean RTs showed worse comprehension performance, and specifically, for the 
ambiguous as compared to the unambiguous sentences. Processing speed was unrelated to 
comprehension performance with unambiguous sentences. As one side note, the demographic 
variables of age, gender, and years of education were not significantly correlated with 
comprehension accuracy in either ambiguous or unambiguous sentences (see Table 4). 
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<<Insert Table 8 about here>> 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the role of individual differences in the 
resolution of temporary syntactic ambiguity. From a theoretical and statistical point of view, 
the current study represents a more thorough investigation of intelligence and the two least 
studied executive functions (i.e. inhibition and shifting) with respect to ambiguity resolution 
than has been done previously. Our primary focus was whether individual differences in 
executive function and intelligence are related to individual differences in syntactic 
ambiguity resolution, and if so, the magnitude of those effects. In the remainder of the 
discussion, we first summarize the results and discuss the implications with a particular view 
towards building upon the most recent and relevant research (i.e. Van Dyke et al., 2014; 
Vuong & Martin, 2013). In the second section, we address the issue of shared and unique 
variance between different individual differences measures of cognitive ability. Lastly, we 
present the strength and limitations.  
To summarize the main findings, we observed that intelligence and processing speed 
interacted with the structure type manipulation such that individual differences (in 
intelligence and processing speed) were related to performance on ambiguous sentences and 
less so on unambiguous sentences. Inhibition also produced a marginal effect on 
comprehension, and individuals with better inhibitory control were more likely to answer 
correctly on comprehension questions regardless of whether ambiguity was present. Recall 
that Vuong and Martin (2013) argued that domain-specific executive control (i.e. verbal 
Stroop performance) plays an important role in syntactic ambiguity resolution, accounting for 
approximately 13% of the variance. More specifically, they argued that control mechanisms 
employed during ambiguity resolution are specific to the verbal domain and primarily 
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inhibitory in nature. In the current study, we utilized an exploratory factor analysis to extract 
variance across many tasks. Our test battery contained one verbal inhibition task (Stroop) and 
one non-verbal inhibition task (stop signal reaction time). Results of the factor analysis 
showed that both loaded on the same factor. The loading was slightly greater for the non-
verbal task (.70 vs. -.63), and thus, our “inhibition” variable may be slightly biased toward 
non-verbal inhibition. Moreover, the bivariate correlations (between Stroop performance and 
ambiguous conditions) in our dataset were non-significant and substantially lower than those 
reported by Vuong and Martin (2013). Recall that Christianson et al. (2006) and Engelhardt 
et al. (2008) also did not establish a strong link between groups with deficits in inhibitory 
control and garden-path reanalysis. The current results are more in line with those studies. 
There are several differences between studies that may preclude direct comparisons (e.g. 
different type of ambiguity, different type of reading, etc.). However, our sample was nearly 
three and a half times larger, and consisted of a wider range of ages and abilities. The sample 
in the Vuong and Martin (2013) study consisted of ~50 undergraduate students attending one 
of the most selective universities in the United States. Thus, the coefficients produced from 
our models are likely more stable and more generalizable. On the basis of our data, we 
conclude that ambiguity resolution does not rely heavily on inhibitory processing, and in 
addition, that most of the variance in inhibition is shared with individual differences in 
intelligence (Burgess, Gray, Conway, & Braver, 2011; Miyake & Freidman, 2012).  
One possibility for the lack of a significant effect of inhibition concerns the type of 
ambiguity. We know from many studies that the object/subject ambiguity is a particularly 
difficult one to process (e.g. Ferreira et al., 2001), and so, if the ambiguity is extremely 
strong, then perhaps there is not much “competition” between the two interpretations.5 Sturt 
(2007) found that full reanalysis was more likely in situations where there was also a 
                                                          
5
 The same may also be true of particularly weak ambiguities as well (e.g. coordination ambiguity).  
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semantic cue (i.e. plausibility information) present in the sentence. From our data, we cannot 
exclude this possibility, but we think it is unlikely for several reasons. First, there are a 
substantial number of correct responses (i.e. approximately one-third of the ambiguous 
sentences were interpreted correctly). Second, a pupillometry study involving auditory 
versions of these exact same sentences showed graded responses in pupil diameter, rather 
than a bi-modal distribution, which would be indicative of full- vs. partial-reanalysis 
(Engelhardt et al., 2010; Farmer, Anderson, & Spivey, 2007). Finally, many prominent 
models of sentence comprehension assume parallel interpretations of syntactic ambiguity 
(e.g. MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994). However, at this juncture, we are not in 
a position to rule out a “strength of ambiguity” argument concerning the null effect of 
inhibition (Novick et al., 2010), that would require a study examining individual differences 
in inhibitory control and a range of different syntactic ambiguities (Frazier & Clifton, 2001). 
We can say definitively, that inhibition does not play a significant role in the interpretation of 
object/subject ambiguities investigated here, which is consistent with prior research (e.g. 
Christianson et al., 2006; Engelhardt et al., 2008).    
With respect to interactions, we observed a significant interaction between 
intelligence and comprehension accuracy. Intelligence was more related to performance on 
the ambiguous sentences compared to the unambiguous sentences. In order to understand the 
role of (domain-general) intelligence in sentence processing, we tested two verbal subtests 
and two performance subtests. Our factor analysis showed that the highest loading on Factor 
1 was vocabulary, which requires participants to provide the definitions of words. Van Dyke 
et al. (2014) reported that vocabulary was most consistently and uniquely associated with 
interference problems during reading (see also Joshi, 2005). It is important to keep in mind 
that the Van Dyke et al. comprehension task also involved a memory load component, which 
is very different from the straightforward reading task used in the current study. Whereas our 
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task focused on syntactic processing, the Van Dyke et al. task is more complex insofar as it 
included a dual-task memory component on top of comprehension. However, to explain the 
vocabulary effect, Van Dyke et al. stressed the importance of the quality of lexical 
representations in the mental lexicon, which is a substantial departure from most of the 
previous work looking at executive functioning (and in particular working memory capacity) 
in language comprehension (e.g. Caplan & Waters, 1999, 2002; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; 
Daneman & Merikle, 1996;  Federenko et al., 2006; King & Just, 1991; Lewis & Vasishth, 
2005; Lewis et al., 2006; Waters & Caplan, 2001). To follow up on Van Dyke et al.’s 
conclusion, we tested vocabulary in a model with structure type and verb type. Results 
indicated that individual differences in vocabulary were more related to performance with the 
verb type manipulation (see Table 9). With vocabulary in the model, verb type was no longer 
significant and neither was the structure type by verb type interaction. This finding indicates 
that participants with better knowledge of word meanings (i.e., individuals who can provide 
definitions for increasingly complex and abstract words) show fewer differences between the 
reflexive and optionally transitive verbs.6 For the most part, we agree with the conclusion that 
qualitative differences in the mental lexicon are associated with performance differences in 
reading (Guo, Roehrig, & Williams, 2011; Nation, 2009; Perfetti, 2007; Perfetti & Hart, 
2002; Protopapas et al., 2013; Tunmer & Chapman, 2012). In particular, we believe that 
higher performing individuals likely have greater precision and breadth of information for 
words stored in the lexicon. Moreover, these differences, like other forms of crystallized 
intelligence, are likely derived through variations in experience with both oral and written 
language (Cunningham & Stanovich, 1990; Wells, Christianson, Race, Acheson, & 
MacDonald, 2009).    
                                                          
6
 It should also be noted that vocabulary also showed some relationship with structure type, as there was a 
marginal interaction between vocabulary and syntactic structure. However, the bi-variate correlations with 
vocabulary were highly similar to extracted intelligence variable (compare Tables 4 and 7). 
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The final predictor of comprehension accuracy was processing speed. We also 
attribute this effect to individual differences in domain-general intelligence (Bates & Stough, 
1997; Bickley, Keith, & Wolfe, 1995; Der & Deary, 2003; Martin, 2001; Salthouse, 1996). 
Processing speed is a second-level factor in the Three-Stratum Model of intelligence (Carroll, 
1993). However, processing speed has the lowest factor loading (.672) of all second-level 
factors on g in Carroll’s model. With respect to the current data, processing speed showed a 
clear dissociation between the ambiguous and unambiguous sentences. Processing speed was 
significantly correlated with performance in the ambiguous conditions in sentence 
comprehension and correlated with no other measures, except vocabulary. The correlation 
between speed and fullscale intelligence was marginal, but at this point, it remains an open 
issue why processing speed, if it is indeed a general factor, did not correlate with more 
measures in the test battery. One possibility is that if processing speed is a borderline 
predictor of g, then it makes sense that correlations with other individual difference measures 
would also tend to be non-significant or at best, mixed (Deary, Der, & Ford, 2001). Another 
issue to keep in mind is that the Wechsler tests do not map perfectly onto fluid and 
crystallized intelligence, which tend to be the focus of models of intelligence (e.g. Carroll, 
1993) and studies that attempt to explain individual differences in basic mental abilities (Das, 
2002; Deary, 2001; Kline, 1991; Spearman, 1927).  
Our data indicate that faster processors are better able to understand syntactically 
ambiguous sentences as compared to unambiguous sentences. Because in our study we did 
not record eye movements, we are not in a position to make claims regarding how processing 
speed is related to reading times and how that may (or may not) affect comprehension 
accuracy (Kuperman & Van Dyke, 2011). However, one possible explanation of the 
relationship between speed of processing and success in comprehending temporarily 
ambiguous sentences is that individuals who process information more slowly suffer because 
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alternative lexical argument structures and syntactic frames have substantially decayed once 
the disambiguating information is encountered. Essentially, faster processors would be better 
able to maintain multiple interpretations in parallel, which would allow them to select and 
settle on the correct one when disambiguation occurs (MacDonald et al., 1994). Another 
potential explanation focuses on how long the misinterpretation is maintained. Christianson et 
al (2001) varied the position of the head in the subject noun phrase in the main clause and 
found that head-early sentences had lower comprehension compared to head-late sentences 
(Ferreira & Henderson, 1991). One possibility that our data does allow us to rule out is how 
long participants spent reading the sentence, as sentence reading times were not correlated 
with comprehension accuracy in any of the four within subject’s conditions (all p’s > .10).   
The final point we want to draw from the current study concerns shared vs. unique 
variance among executive functions and intelligence (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). Vuong and 
Martin (2013) highlighted this issue: To make conclusions about how individual differences 
in general mental abilities impact on sentence processing, the issue of shared variance must 
be addressed. In the current study, we attempted to deal with shared variance using a two-
stage process. In the first stage, we submitted the test battery to an exploratory factor 
analysis. Some might argue that the exploratory nature of these types of tests is less than 
ideal. However, if the results of the analysis map onto the theoretically-based explanations of 
what those tests measure, then the likelihood of a purely chance result is dramatically 
decreased. Moreover, the results of our factor analysis clearly did not necessitate any post-
hoc explanations. Instead, the results of our factor analysis were relatively straightforward: 
The intelligence measures loaded on the same factor, and the two inhibition tasks also loaded 
on the same factor. The only exceptions were the Trails task, perseveration errors, and one of 
the Wechsler subtests. However, the Trails task is a timed task, and as mentioned previously, 
it requires inhibiting the normal (and highly overlearned) symbol-to-word mapping involved 
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in naming numbers. The second stage that we used to eliminate (shared) variance was to 
partial the variance in intelligence from both inhibition and processing speed. With both, 
removing variance in intelligence resulted in lower correlations with the sentence processing 
task. However, significant variance remained for processing speed, which indicates unique 
variance. One caveat to note is that there has been some recent controversy about the 
interpretation of residualized predictors, despite the widespread use of this technique in the 
literature. Wurm and Fisicaro (2014) ran several simulations which suggested that 
residualizing frequently does not change results in the intended way. In our study, there were 
no substantial differences when intelligence was partialled from either inhibition or 
processing speed, except that inhibition went from a marginal predictor (.077) to clearly not 
significant (.471). We also ran the mixed model analysis with both predictors in the model 
(one of the options suggested by Wurm and Fisicaro) and results showed that intelligence and 
the intelligence by ambiguity interaction were significant (both p’s < .05) but inhibition was 
not (p = .28). We included the results of this follow up analysis in Table 9. 
 
<<Insert Table 9 about here>> 
   
Strengths and Limitations 
The main strength of the study is that it simultaneously tested a broad set of predictor 
variables, which allowed us to more accurately assess the individual contributions of several 
theoretically relevant constructs. An obvious problem with studies that examined one or two 
measures of executive control is that they do not account for shared variance. In the 
Introduction, we noted this as a limitation of the Vuong and Martin study, which reported that 
13% of the variance in garden-path comprehension was attributable to verbal Stroop 
performance. It is highly likely that part of the variance reported by Vuong and Martin is 
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attributable to shared variance with other executive functions and/or intelligence. A second 
strength of the current study concerns the sample: both its size and its breadth. Sentence 
comprehension studies of community-recruited participants rather than undergraduates are 
rare but important if the goal is to obtain a clear understanding of individual differences in 
language processing ability, and their relationships to other cognitive variables. Our study is 
also unusual in its use of such a large sample, which gave us greater power to detect 
significant relationships and more confidence in the stability of the results.  
Two limitations are also worth noting. The first is that our test battery did not include 
measures of working memory. When the study was designed, the focus was predominantly 
on executive functions relating to inhibitory control and mental flexibility. Future studies 
should include measures of working memory as well in order to gain an even more 
comprehensive understanding of the role of executive function in garden-path reanalysis, 
although we note that working memory capacity has already received a great deal of attention 
in the language processing literature, whereas the variables investigated here have been much 
less explored. The second limitation is that we did not collect online processing measures. 
Thus, we cannot identify how executive functions or intelligence affect word-by-word 
processing of temporary ambiguities. Nonetheless, we believe the results we have obtained 
for comprehension set the stage for follow-up studies with online measures, such as eye 
tracking. Also, our data concerning the likelihood of successfully interpreting a garden-path 
sentence should help to inform predictions concerning effects of executive functions on 
measures of online, incremental interpretation (Kuperman & Van Dyke, 2011; Prat & Just, 
2011; Van Dyke et al., 2014). 
Conclusions 
The current results provide an important stepping stone as psychological theories and 
computational models of reading become more sophisticated and incorporate lower-level 
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control mechanisms (i.e. executive abilities), as well domain-general abilities such as 
intelligence (Adolf, Catts, & Little, 2006; Johnston & Kirby, 2006; Joshi & Aaron, 2000; 
Protopapas, Simos, Sideridis, & Mouzaki, 2012; Tiu, Thompson, & Lewis, 2003; Ye & Zhou, 
2009a,b). In general, we feel that greater attention should be paid to these sorts of issues and, 
until very recently, this has been an empirically neglected research area. The dearth of 
research may be in part due to the fact that acquired knowledge, such as vocabulary, is not as 
interesting from a cognitive psychological point of view as compared to more domain-general 
abilities, such as working memory. This study makes an important contribution to the 
literature by addressing these particular knowledge gaps. On the basis of these data, explicit 
predictions can be made about how individual differences in mental abilities affect language 
comprehension. We observed that intelligence and processing speed have reliable and unique 
contributions with regard to overcoming temporary misinterpretations arising from syntactic 
ambiguity. Thus, this study represents a step towards integrating findings from sentence 
comprehension within the larger task of understanding individual variation.  
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Left panel shows the intelligence by sentence structure interaction and the right the 
reaction time by sentence structure interaction.  
 
  




Example stimuli for object/subject garden-path sentences   
 
Reflexive verbs  
1. While Anna dressed the baby that was small and cute spit up on the bed. (Ambiguous) 
2. The baby that was small and cute spit up on the bed while Anna dressed. (Unambiguous) 
Comprehension question  
3. Did Anna dressed the baby? 
 
Optionally-transitive verbs  
4. While Susan wrote the letter that was long and eloquent fell off the table. (Ambiguous) 
5. The letter that was long and eloquent fell off the table while Susan wrote. (Unambiguous) 
Comprehension question  








Means and standard deviations for demographic variables 
  
Variable    Mean (SD)  Minimum Maximum  
Age (years)   19.91 (5.36)  14.0  37.0   
Gender (male)   43.7%      
Education (years)  12.90 (2.61)  9.0  19.0   
Fullscale IQ    112.92 (12.84) 67.57  144.59   
Ethnicity 
African American 9.8% 
Asian/Asian American 2.3% 
Native American  1.1% 
Latino   1.7% 
White   78.2% 
Other/mixed/unreported 6.9% 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for the intelligence sub-tests, executive function measures, and garden-path task  
Measure   N  Mean  SD  Min   Max  Skew  Kurtosis 
IQ sub-tests 
Vocabulary   174  12.38  2.73  5.00  19.00  .012  .203 
Similarities   174  12.03  2.94  4.00  19.00  .337  -.164 
Picture completion  174  11.46  2.74  4.00  17.00  -.129  -.861 
Matrix/Block design  174  12.11  2.86  1.00  18.00  -.568  1.122 
EF tasks 
Stop signal RTc  174  5.44  .23  4.55  6.13  -.065  1.724 
Go RTc   174  6.33  .18  5.71  6.78  -.079  .149 
Stroop    174  10.52  7.93  -11.39  36.25  .261  .773 
Trails B – Aa   174  5.08  1.21  1.98  8.98  .412  1.073 
Perseveration errorsb  174  .18  .06  .06  .33  .412  -.062 
Garden-path task 
Unambiguous optional 174  .52  .24  0.00  1.00  -.082  -.467 
Unambiguous reflexive 174  .91  .15  .17  1.00  -2.150  5.369 
Ambiguous optional  174  .21  .30  0.00  1.00  1.421  .833 
Ambiguous reflexive  174  .39  .36  0.00  1.00  .590  -1.105 
 
Note. asquare root transformation, binverse transformation, and clogarithm transformation.  
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Table 4 
Bivariate correlations between intelligence, executive function, and garden-path tasks 
Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
  
1. Age  - .10 .85** .02 .01 -.04 .13 -.02 -.04 -.08 -.03 -.04 .08 .06 .00 .02 .11 
2. Gender  - .11 -.15* -.15* -.06 -.10 -.03 -.05 .03 .03 -.09 .03 .07 -.06 .07 .02  
3. Education   - .10 .10 .07 .10 .06 -.15* -.12 .06 -.09 .15* .12 .06 .04 .12 
4. Fullscale IQ   - .66** .60** .54** .67** -.09 -.11 .16* -.24** .31** .18* .15* .26** .32** 
5. Vocabulary     - .50** .26** .37** -.12 -.18* -.06 -.13 .25** .18* .14 .21** .30** 
6. Similarities      - .21** .39** -.06 -.01 .13 -.21** .20** .10 -.07 .09 .13 
7. Picture completion      - .33** .01 -.08 .08 -.02 .23** .08 .09 .04 .07 
8. Matrix/Block       - -.10 -.06 .21** -.35** .21** .07 .10 .15* .19* 
9. Stop signal RT        - -.04 -.22** .23** -.19* -.17* -.17* -.02 -.02 
10. Go RT          - .05 .07 .02 .02 -.07 -.18* -.22** 
11. Stroop           - -.18* .09 .06 .02 .12 .11 
12. Trails B – A           - -.23** -.08 .00 -.20** -.12 
13. Perseveration errors           - .01 .16* .11 .10 
14. Unambiguous – optional            - .40** .42** .34** 
15. Unambiguous – reflexive              - .24** .22** 
16. Ambiguous – optional               - .76** 
17. Ambiguous – reflexive               - 
  
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01. Gender coded 0 = male and 1 = female.   
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Table 5 
Factor loadings from maximum likelihood factor analysis  
Variable   F1  F2  F3 
1. Vocabulary  .75  -.07  -.31 
2. Similarities  .72  -.15  -.06 
3. Picture   .63  .03  .08 
4. Matrix/block .71  -.39  -.17 
5. SSRT  -.07  .70  -.05 
6. Go RT  -.07  -.06  .90 
7. Stroop  .11  -.63  .22 
8. Trails B – A  -.27  .68  .29 
9. Perseveration .48  -.36  .16 
Note. SSRT = stop signal RT. 
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Table 6 
Mixed model results for structure type, verb type, and individual differences  
Model/Predictor  Estimate SE  Wald-Z p 
(Intercept)   -0.6583 0.3992  -1.649  0.0992 
Structure   3.8543      0.5543    6.954   3.56e-12 *** 
Verb    -1.1704      0.5443   -2.150    0.0315 * 
Structure × Verb  -1.9253      0.7753   -2.483    0.0130 * 
 
(Intercept)   -0.6701 0.3972  -1.687  0.0916 
Structure   3.8549  0.5527  6.975  3.06e-12*** 
Verb    -1.1636 0.5427  -2.144  0.0320* 
Intelligence   0.5756  0.1379  4.173  3.03e-05*** 
Structure × Verb  -1.9243 0.7731  -2.489  0.0128* 
Structure × Intelligence -0.2820 0.1457  -1.937  0.0528* 
Verb × Intelligence  -0.1669 0.1279  -1.305  0.1919 
Structure × Verb × Intellig. 0.0854  0.1879  0.454  0.6496 
 
(Intercept)   -0.6585 0.3982  -1.654  0.0982 
Structure   3.8569  0.5537  6.967  3.17e-12*** 
Verb    -1.1799 0.5436  -2.170  0.0300* 
Inhibition   -0.2413 0.1364  -1.769  0.0769 
Structure × Verb  -1.9192 0.7745  -2.478  0.0132* 
Structure × Inhibition  -0.0274 0.1407  -0.195  0.8455 
Verb × Inhibition  -0.1381 0.1270  -1.088  0.2767 
Structure × Verb × Inhibit. 0.2219  0.1858  1.194  0.2323 
 
(Intercept)   -0.6726 0.3983  -1.689  0.0913 
Structure   3.8559  0.5534  6.967  3.2e-12*** 
Verb    -1.1918 0.5438  -2.191  0.0284* 
Speed    -0.4867 0.1352  -3.599  0.0003*** 
Structure × Verb  -1.8933 0.7743  -2.445  0.0145* 
Structure × Speed  0.3532  0.1513  2.334  0.0196* 
Verb × Speed   0.0087  0.1183  0.073  0.9417 
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Table 7 
Interfactor correlations and correlations with garden-path task 
Variable  F1 F2 F3 Amb – opt  Amb – rat  Unam – opt  Unam – rat  
F1. IQ   - -.20** -.07 .18*  .25**  .14  .11 
F2. Inhibition  - -.04 -.15*  -.10  -.12  -.10 
F3. Processing speed  - -.21**  -.23**  -.02  -.04 
Note. **p < .01, *p < .05. 
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Table 8  
Mixed model results for structure type, verb type, and individual differences  
Model/Predictor  Estimate SE  Wald-Z p 
Intelligence partialled from inhibition 
(Intercept)   -0.6587    0.3990   -1.651    0.0988 
Structure   3.8576  0.5543  6.959  3.42e-12*** 
Verb    -1.1749 0.5443  -2.159  0.0309* 
Inhibition   -0.1010 0.1399  -0.722  0.4705 
Structure × Verb  -1.9240 0.7754  -2.481  0.0131* 
Structure × Inhibition  -0.0828 0.1436  -0.577  0.5642 
Verb × Inhibition  -0.1698 0.1281  -1.325  0.1853 
Structure × Verb × Inhibit. 0.2246  0.1888  1.189  0.2344 
 
Intelligence partialled from processing speed 
(Intercept)   -0.6698 0.3990  -1.679  0.0932 
Structure   3.8580  0.5541  6.962  3.35e-12*** 
Verb    -1.1894 0.5444  -2.184  0.0290* 
Speed    -0.4086 0.1366  -2.992  0.0028** 
Structure × Verb  -1.8991 0.7753  -2.449  0.0143* 
Structure × Speed  0.3310  0.1526  2.169  0.0300* 
Verb × Speed   -0.0064 0.1180  -0.054  0.9567 
Structure × Verb × Speed 0.1191  0.1904  0.626  0.5315 
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Table 9 
Mixed model results for structure type, verb type, and individual differences  
Model/Predictor  Estimate SE  Wald-Z p 
Vocabulary 
(Intercept)   -3.80891 0.73373 -5.191  2.09e-07*** 
Structure   5.08442 0.86997 5.844  5.09e-09*** 
Verb    -0.25154 0.78968 -0.319  0.7501 
Vocabulary   0.25313 0.04955 5.108  3.25e-07*** 
Structure × Verb  -2.09173 1.15189 -1.816  0.0694 
Structure × Vocabulary -0.09896 0.05574 -1.775  0.0758 
Verb × Vocabulary  -0.07328 0.04521 -1.621  0.1050 
Structure × Verb × Vocab. 0.01303 0.06963 0.187  0.8516 
 
Four-way interaction with intelligence and inhibition 
(Intercept)             -0.6913     0.3986   -1.734    0.0829   
Structure           3.8769     0.5547   6.990   2.76e-12*** 
Verb                  -1.1814     0.5447   -2.169    0.0301*   
Intelligence                  0.5631     0.1418    3.971  7.15e-05*** 
Inhibition                     -0.1511     0.1384   -1.092    0.2750     
Structure × Verb   -1.8875     0.7759   -2.433    0.0150*   
Structure × Intelligence -0.3049     0.1545   -1.974    0.0484*   
Structure × Inhibition  -0.0705    0.1457   -0.484    0.6286     
Verb × Intelligence      -0.2011     0.1297   -1.551    0.1208     
Verb × Inhibition         -0.1759     0.1293   -1.360    0.1738     
Structure × Verb × Intel 0.0968     0.1974   0.491    0.6237     
Struct × Verb × Inhibit 0.2728     0.1915    1.425    0.1542     
Structure × Intel × Inhibit  -0.0268     0.1321   -0.203    0.8394     
Verb × Intelligence × Inhibit  -0.0417    0.1150   -0.363    0.7167 
Struct × Verb × Intel × Inhibit 0.1770     0.1625    1.089    0.2760 
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